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ABSTRACT. The custody threshold provision in England andWales was intended to
operate as a limit on the use of custodial sentences, preservingwhat is the system’smost
severe sanction for the most serious oﬀences. However over the past few decades it has
become apparent that the custody threshold is failing. Academics have discussed the
reasons for this failure, which has seen the prison population double in space of a
quarter of a century. This piece explores the custody threshold in the context of the use
of custody in otherWestern European jurisdictions. It examines the courts’ response to
the provision and various judicial attempts to amplify Parliament’s language. The
authors then consider the academic critiques of the custody threshold provision,
analysing the extent to which said criticism can be seen as a solution to the problem,
before oﬀering a new critique of their own. Finally, in a move towards more a more
principled approach to the custody threshold, the piece oﬀers a solutionwhichwould, it
is argued, make the provision more eﬀective and more theoretically sound.
There are compelling arguments to support the use of restraint with
respect to sentences of imprisonment. First, a term of imprisonment
costs approximately four times as much as a community order of the
same duration.1 Second, a great deal of research has demonstrated
that custody is associated with higher rates of re-oﬀending than
community penalties.2 Short-term imprisonment disrupts the pro-
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fessional and personal lives of prisoners (and their families) with little
compensating beneﬁt in terms of rehabilitation. Longer-term
imprisonment impairs the life prospects of ex-prisoners for years after
release. There are also considerations beyond the individual oﬀender.
Many western jurisdictions have for years struggled to constrain their
prison populations. England and Wales has both a rising prison
population3 and a use of custody which is signiﬁcantly higher than
most other western European nations such as Germany. For all these
reasons, there is a clear imperative to resort to custody only when
absolutely necessary, when no lesser, non-custodial sanction would
be appropriate. This position is captured by the principle of restraint
or parsimony.
Regulating the use of imprisonment creates challenges for legis-
latures. One method of constraining the use of custody involves
codifying a direction to courts to use custody only for certain oﬀences
or oﬀenders. This approach often takes the form of a custody
‘‘threshold’’ provision, whereby an oﬀender may not be imprisoned
unless the oﬀence has crossed some threshold of seriousness. For
example, England and Wales placed a seriousness-based custody
threshold on a statutory footing (in 1991), instructing courts not to
pass a custodial sentence unless the court was of the opinion that the
oﬀending behaviour was so serious that neither a ﬁne alone nor a
community sentence could be justiﬁed for the oﬀence.4 Other juris-
dictions have introduced similar provisions.5
Legislative directions of this kind represent a common approach to
ensuring that imprisonment is reserved for the most serious oﬀences.
Yet sentencing and prison statistics conﬁrm that custody threshold
provisions have proven ineﬀective in restricting prison to the most
serious oﬀences, with the result that custodial populations in many
3 Between 1993 and 2015, the prison population almost doubled, rising from
44,200 to 86,000. See Ministry of Justice, Oﬀender Management Statistics Quarterly:
Prison Population, 30 September 2015. (London: Ministry of Justice).
4 Criminal Justice Act 1991 s.1 was the ﬁrst general ‘‘custody threshold’’ provision
in England and Wales. The provision also permitted a custodial sentence to be
imposed where it was necessary to protect the public. Section 1 was repealed and re-
enacted in 2000 by the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.79. That
provision was in turn repealed and re-enacted in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.152.
Earlier pieces of legislation contained a test of ‘appropriateness’ for the imposition of
speciﬁc custodial sentences, e.g. detention in a detention centre under CJA 1948 s.18.
5 See J.V. Roberts and E. Baker, ‘‘Sentencing Structure and Reform in Common
Law Jurisdictions’’ in S. Shoham, O. Beck, and M. Kett (eds.), International
Handbook of Penology and Criminal Justice (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2008).
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western nations that have introduced them remain stubbornly high. In
England and Wales, the focus of this article, the prison population
remains near the top of the EU prison statistics table: a recent report
found that England and Wales reported an imprisonment rate of 148
per 100,000 – signiﬁcantly higher than other western European coun-
tries such as Germany (76), France (100) and Italy (86).6
This article explores the statutory provision in England and Wales
which currently regulates the use of custody as a sanction.We consider
how this key provision couldmore eﬀectively ensure that only themost
serious cases receive a term of imprisonment. Criticism of the current
provision has led to calls to abandon the concept altogether.7 In con-
trast, we advocate revision rather than repeal of the custody threshold
provision. There are several reasons for focusing on the custodial
threshold as a potential mechanism to restrict the use of custody as a
sanction. First, most common law countries have adopted some form
of custody threshold; there is therefore a signiﬁcant international
experience with this strategy for directing courts away from the
imposition of custodywhich can inform reform in this jurisdiction (just
as, in turn, our analysis of the deﬁciencies of the current provision in
England and Wales carries lessons for other jurisdictions). Second,
amending a single provision is more feasible than larger-scale (or
longer-term) reforms such as adjusting guideline sentence recommen-
dations across a wide range of oﬀences.8 Third, a provision of this kind
carries an important message to courts and also to the community
about the need for penal restraint and the role of imprisonment.
Part I describes the origins of the custodial threshold, and sum-
marises academic criticism. The current statutory provision has been
criticised for being too vague, and for permitting a very subjective
determination of the kinds of cases for which custody is ‘‘inevitable’’;
an unclear provision leaves diﬀerent judges with the discretion to set
the threshold wherever they believe appropriate. Part II explores
ways in which this element of sentencing law may be improved. We
6 Institute for Criminal Policy Research (2015) World Prison Brief: Prison Popu-
lation Totals. Available at: www.prisonstudies.org/.
7 N. Padﬁeld, ‘‘Time to Bury the Custody Threshold?’’ [2011] Criminal Law Re-
view 593.
8 In a jurisdiction like Minnesota, the use of custody can be regulated directly
through the presumptive sentencing guidelines. These mandate a sentence or range of
sentence for speciﬁc oﬀences or categories of oﬀender. The Minnesota Sentencing
Commission can therefore regulate the use of custody or alternatives to custody by
assigning oﬀences to diﬀerent locations within the two-dimensional sentencing grid.
Minnesota courts are required by statute to follow the sentence recommendations.
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propose a re-framing of the custodial threshold, one which restricts
the inﬂuence of factors such as prior convictions or plea which are
unrelated to the gravity of the oﬀence. The justiﬁcation for focusing
on the relationship between custody and previous convictions is that
a common cause of imprisonment for oﬀenders convicted of less
serious oﬀences is the oﬀender’s criminal history. This is true in all
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions but particularly England and Wales and
the United States.9 Part III makes some concluding remarks. We
suggest that our proposed reforms would not only make the custody
threshold provision more eﬀective at restraining the use of custody as
a sanction, but also make the concept more theoretically sound.
I ORIGINS AND CRITIQUES OF THE CUSTODY THRESH-
OLD
The ‘‘custody threshold’’ in England and Wales is located in s.152(2)
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This provision mirrors those found
in other common law jurisdictions10 and has been the subject of much
academic criticism. The principal critique of the custody threshold
concerns the lack of clarity of the statutory language, and the way in
which the test has been interpreted by the courts. It is asserted that
the provision is vague and allows (or even encourages) a subjective
interpretation; as a result, it is inconsistently applied.11 Moreover,
commentators have said that despite the ‘‘tight’’ wording of the
provision, it has proved ineﬀective in restricting custody to the most
serious cases.
Section 152(2) entitled ‘‘General restrictions on imposing discre-
tionary custodial sentences’’ states:
9 For example, in a recent analysis of sentencing statistics Roberts and Watson
demonstrated that a high percentage of oﬀenders convicted of a minor oﬀence such
as shoplifting were committed to custody as a result of their prior convictions. See
J.V. Roberts and G. Watson, ‘‘Reducing female admissions to custody: Exploring
the options at sentencing’’ (2015) 15 Criminology and Criminal Justice 1.
10 For example, s. 16 of the Sentencing Act 2002 in New Zealand and s. 718.2(e) of
the Criminal Code of Canada. The German law (which is addressed in Harrendorf’s
article in this issue) is rather diﬀerent, in that what English law calls ‘‘community
orders’’ can only be imposed on oﬀenders as part of shaping the terms of a sus-
pended sentence (or as a condition of a later release on parole).
11 Padﬁeld, fn. 7 above, at 610, observed that ‘‘the height of the custody threshold’
seems to vary between sentencers and over time’’.
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The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the
oﬀence, or the combination of the oﬀence and one or more oﬀences associated
with it, was so serious that neither a ﬁne alone nor a community sentence can
be justiﬁed for the oﬀence.
This provision had an important predecessor in the Criminal Justice
Act 1991 which was considered by academics to constitute ‘‘a land-
mark of sentencing legislation’’.12 Section 1(2) of the 1991 Act stated:
‘‘Subject to subsection (3) below, the court shall not pass a custodial sentence
on the oﬀender unless it is of the opinion
(a) that the oﬀence, or the combination of the oﬀence and one or more oﬀences
associated with it, was so serious that only such a sentence can be justiﬁed for
the oﬀence; or
(b) where the oﬀence is a violent or sexual oﬀence, that only such a sentence
would be adequate to protect the public from serious harm from him.’’
Section 1(2) of the 1991 Act led to the use of the term ‘‘custody
threshold’’.13 However, the concept of a ‘‘line in the sand’’ between
avoidable and unavoidable custodial sentences existed in common
law prior to the Act.14 Section 1(2) formalised that concept by cre-
ating a general statutory restriction on the use of custody. It was
underpinned by the 1990 Government White Paper, Crime, Justice
and Protecting the Public,15 which was clear in its intention that with
the 1991 Act, the government would pursue a more systematic ap-
proach to sentencing. Wasik and von Hirsch, who saw previous
sentencing legislation as ‘‘a rag-bag of proposals which reﬂect[ed]
short-term considerations with little inherent coherence’’, noted with
approval that the 1990 White Paper was ‘‘substantially along the
right lines in advocating a coherent set of guiding principles for
sentencing’’.16 The ‘‘thoughtful approach’’ pursued by the govern-
ment therefore stems from an emphasis upon principle and consid-
ered sentencing policy, as opposed to short termism and politics.
12 Ibid. at 594.
13 Ibid. at 593.
14 See R. v Stone [1977] Q.B. 354, R. v Tisdall (1984) 6 Cr. App. R. (S.) 155 and R.
v Stewart (1987) 9 Cr. App. R. (S.) 135 as three such examples.
15 Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public, Cm 965, Home Oﬃce, 1990. London:
HMSO.
16 M. Wasik and A. von Hirsch, ‘‘Statutory Sentencing Principles: The 1990 White
Paper’’ (1990) 53 Modern Law Review, 508, 517.
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Commenting speciﬁcally upon the proposed custody threshold pro-
vision in the White Paper, however, Wasik and von Hirsch remarked
that ‘‘something clearer is needed’’.17
The 1991 Act largely failed to deliver, however, and was thought
by some to have been let down (at least in part) by its drafting.18
Section 1(2) of the 1991 Act was interpreted in R. v Cox19 by Lord
Chief Justice Lord Taylor, who indicated that the phrase ‘‘so serious
that only such a sentence can be justiﬁed for the oﬀence’’ meant
the kind of oﬀence which when committed by a young person would make
right-thinking members of the public, knowing all the facts, feel that justice
had not been done by the passing of any sentence other than a custodial
one.20
Subsequent cases did not clarify this more satisfactorily, merely
applying the test without consideration as to its clarity.21 Ashworth
queried whether such a sweeping test as that formulated by Lord
Taylor CJ was in fact the best that we can do, questioning both the
propriety of such an approach and the accuracy with which the views
of ‘‘right-thinking’’ people could be determined.22 He proposed a
presumption that certain types of oﬀences would not attract custodial
sentences. Although such a measure would result in a reduction in the
use of custody in practice, its application would need to confront the
17 Ibid. at 517.
18 One such example was said to be that: ‘‘The provision on the length of prison
sentences stated only that sentences should be commensurate with the seriousness of
the oﬀence’ and this was not enough to prevent the then Lord Chief Justice from
distorting the provision by construing it to mean commensurate with the punish-
ment and deterrence which the seriousness of the oﬀence requires’.’’ (A. Ashworth
and E. Player, ‘‘Criminal Justice Act 2003: The Sentencing Provisions’’ (2005) 68
Modern Law Review 822, at 822).
19 [1993] 1 W.L.R. 188; (1993) 14 Cr. App. R. (S.) 479 CA (Crim Div).
20 This interpretation was adopted from the decision in R. v Bradbourn (1985) 7
Cr. App. R. (S.) 180 CA (Crim Div) in which Lawton LJ had interpreted s.1(4) of the
Criminal Justice Act 1982, a provision limiting the use of youth custody to cases
which were ‘‘so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justiﬁed’’.
21 For example R. v Keogh (1994) 15 Cr. App. R. (S.) 279 and R. v Husbands
(1993) 14 Cr. App. R. (S.) 709.
22 Ashworth’s criticism of the propriety of such an approach was on the basis that
it was questionable how well-informed the ‘‘right-thinking member of the public’’
was about the nature and function of other forms of sentence. See A. Ashworth,
‘‘Elephants and sentencing: a duty unfulﬁlled’’ [1994] Criminal Law Review 153, at
154.
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principle of ordinal proportionality, which may present some prac-
tical and theoretical challenges to this approach.23
In an article published in 1997, von Hirsch and Ashworth asserted
that the ‘‘right-thinking member of the public test’’ was ‘‘conceptu-
ally ﬂawed and empirically unsupported’’,24 and suggested that the
aim should be a progression towards ‘‘ﬁrmer criteria in sentencing’’:
although the custody threshold was ultimately left to the discretion of
the sentencer, they argued that the test should ‘‘require a normative
judgment rather than an exercise of discretion…on an unprincipled
basis’’.25
Subsequently, in R. v Howells, then Lord Chief Justice Lord
Bingham considered that:
There is no bright line which separates oﬀences which are so serious that only a
custodial sentence can be justiﬁed from oﬀences which are not so serious as to
require the passing of a custodial sentence. But it cannot be said that the right-
thinking members of the public’ test is very helpful since the sentencing court
has no means of ascertaining the views of right-thinking members of the public
and inevitably attributes to such right-thinking members its own views.26
His Lordship concluded that ‘‘It would be dangerous and wrong for
this court to lay down prescriptive rules governing the exercise of that
judg[e]ment…’’ clearly placing signiﬁcant value in the exercise of
judicial discretion.27 This subsequent development did little to clear
the muddy waters; the court had seemingly endorsed Ashworth’s
criticism of Cox but merely stated that ‘‘test’’ to apply was the court’s
own subjective view of what justice required on the facts before it.
The test therefore remained rather opaque and the custody threshold
diﬃcult to identify.
23 If a sentencing system were to adopt such a measure, it would likely have to
accept a dilution of the principle of ordinal proportionality in order for it to be
eﬀective, as observing ordinal proportionality would require the range of oﬀences to
which the presumption applied to be so wide or so narrow so as to make the pre-
sumption unworkable in practice. While this is not a bar to its successful operation, it
presents a challenge to justify such an approach on theoretical grounds.
24 A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, ‘‘Recognising elephants: the problem of the
custody threshold’’ [1997] Criminal Law Review 187, at 189.
25 Ibid. at 196.
26 [1999] 1 W.L.R. 307, CA (Crim Div).
27 [1999] 1 W.L.R. 307, CA (Crim Div) at 311.
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Koﬀman criticised the Court of Appeal for not providing con-
structive guidance on the interpretation of s.1(2).28 Whether it had
been the intention of the 1991 Act for the Court of Appeal to provide
such guidance, is unclear. However, as set out above, several suc-
cessive Lord Chief Justices ruled on the interpretation of s.1(2). As
such, Koﬀman’s critique is more of an indictment of the lack of
clarity in the drafting of s.1(2) as opposed to the court’s ‘‘failure to
play its part’’. Koﬀman considered that decisions of the court in
upholding immediate custodial sentences in cases involving minor
property oﬀences rendered the threshold ‘‘largely meaningless’’,29
and endorsed the von Hirsch-Ashworth view that the decision not to
interpret the provision in a manner consistent with the purpose of the
1991 Act had set the custody threshold at a point lower rather than
higher than before, this being directly contrary to the intentions set
out in the White Paper.30
The custody threshold provision has changed very little between
its original enactment in 1991 and its current form.31 The main
substantive diﬀerence between the 1991 and the 2003 provisions is the
apparent removal of the second alternative of the 1991 provision for
crossing the custody threshold – that ‘‘the oﬀence is a violent or
sexual oﬀence [and] only such a sentence would be adequate to
protect the public from serious harm from [the oﬀender]’’ – from the
2003 provision. In fact, the public protection exception was retained
but the way it was to apply was modiﬁed. The 2003 Act created a
number of sentences for public protection and the custody threshold
provision was expressed not to apply to such cases. As regards the
28 L. Koﬀman, ‘‘The Rise and Fall of Proportionality: The Failure of the Criminal
Justice Act 1991’’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 281, at 292.
29 Ibid. at 292.
30 Ibid. at 293.
31 Section 1(2) of the 1991 Act was repealed in 2000 and re-enacted in almost
identical terms in the form of Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act
2000 s.79(2): ‘‘Subject to subsection (3) below, the court shall not pass a custodial
sentence on the oﬀender unless it is of the opinion:(a) that the oﬀence, or the
combination of the oﬀence and one or more oﬀences associated with it, was so
serious that only such a sentence can be justiﬁed for the oﬀence; or(b) where the
oﬀence is a violent or sexual oﬀence, that only such a sentence would be adequate to
protect the public from serious harm from him.’’ That provision was repealed in 2005
and re-enacted in Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.152(2): ‘‘The court must not pass a
custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the oﬀence, or the combination of
the oﬀence and one or more oﬀences associated with it, was so serious that neither a
ﬁne alone nor a community sentence can be justiﬁed for the oﬀence.’’
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ﬁrst – and now only – alternative based on oﬀence seriousness, the
changed formulation is intended to draw the line exactly where it was
drawn before, but more clearly so. There has been very little dis-
cussion of section 152 since its enactment – perhaps as a result of
Lord Bingham CJ’s comments in Howells – and any discussion has
unfortunately been little more than descriptive.32 It is clear, then, that
since Howells the Court of Appeal has been consistent in its view that
the threshold test is something of an enigma: attempts to provide
guidance as to the interpretation of earlier incarnations have been
dismissed and no such attempt has been made to provide such
guidance pertaining to the current provision. Parliament’s intention
as to the eﬀect of s.152(2) is that espoused in the 1990 White Paper:
more oﬀenders should be dealt with in the community. Although the
courts have been silent on the issue since Howells, when Parliament’s
intention is set against the statistics for the use of imprisonment as a
disposal it is clear that the custodial threshold requires reform.
1.1 Reactions to the Perceived Failure of the Custody Threshold
Provision to Restrict the Use of Custody
Among the more radical proposals was that advocated by Padﬁeld
who rejected the notion of a ‘‘threshold’’, suggesting that a ‘‘custody
zone’’ may be preferable.33 The argument was premised upon the
false sense of security created by the term ‘‘threshold’’ which, she
argued, suggested clarity where there was none. Whilst it was Par-
liament’s intention that s.152(2) operates as a restriction on the use of
custody, as with its predecessors, Padﬁeld pointed out that there ‘‘is
no easily ascertainable custody threshold’’’. One reason given by
Padﬁeld is that s.152(2) is ﬂanked by provisions concerning an of-
fender’s prior record that allow for custody to be imposed for an
oﬀence that would otherwise not warrant it; and by provisions
allowing a guilty plea to lead to a non-custodial sentence even where
the oﬀence would otherwise warrant its imposition. (Both previous
convictions and plea are discussed at greater length in the next sec-
tion, 1.2, below). Thus, where an oﬀence is so serious that it crosses
the custody threshold, the eventual sentence may properly come be-
neath it and conversely, an oﬀence which appears to fall beneath the
32 See Attorney General’s Reference (No.11 of 2006) (R. v Scarth) [2006] EWCA
Crim 856; [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 108 (p. 705) and R. v Seed [2007] EWCA Crim
254; [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 69 (p. 436) in which Lord Chief Justice Lord Phillips
discussed s.152(2).
33 Padﬁeld, fn. 7 above, at 611.
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custody threshold may cross it by virtue of the oﬀender’s previous
convictions.
Padﬁeld concluded that the absence of a bright line representing
the custody ‘‘threshold’’ rendered it a ‘‘simplistic concept which gets
in the way’’.34 As sentencing is an evaluative task that involves more
complex thought processes than simply weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors so as to locate the oﬀence above or below the
‘‘threshold’’, she argued it was ‘‘time to bury the custody threshold’’.
She proposed a diagram which permitted the disposals to overlap.
While Padﬁeld’s critique made a strong case for reconceptualising the
‘‘threshold’’ as a ‘‘zone’’, her proposal does not constitute a sub-
stantial improvement on the status quo. The ‘‘custody zone’’ may be
a better label for what the current law creates than a ‘‘custody
threshold’’, but the problem remains of how to locate the custody
zone, and determine which cases fall beneath it.
Ashworth focused his criticism on a diﬀerent issue: the apparent
failure of the judiciary to draw the line based on oﬀence seriousness
(and the requirement of proportionate punishment) as such.
Reviewing cases in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Ash-
worth contended that the conclusion in those cases that immediate
custody was inevitable appeared
not to be a judgment of proportionality but rather to derive from the deterrent
rationale or from an expressive or denunciatory rationale, treating imprison-
ment as the only unambiguous way of demonstrating society’s rejection of such
conduct.35
Accordingly, he questioned whether or not there should be another
form of punishment that achieved public censure without imposing
imprisonment. Recognising that such an approach may be divisive,
he suggested tightening the statutory wording and including a
requirement that courts explain why an oﬀender cannot be dealt with
by way of a community penalty when imposing any sentence of under
two years’ custody.36 This, again, makes a compelling case for re-
form, but it is diﬃcult to see how the statutory wording could be
improved upon.
34 Padﬁeld, fn. 7 above, at 612. This is a view arguably shared by Lord Bingham
CJ, see above.
35 A. Ashworth, ‘‘Unavoidable prison sentences?’’ [2013] Criminal Law Review
621, at 621.
36 Ibid. at 622.
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Ashworth’s suggestion that courts might be required to explain
why a community sentence could not be imposed in cases in which a
custodial sentence will be of two years or less sounds attractive in that
it appears to encourage the court to turn its mind to the issue of the
custody threshold. However, two objections might be raised. First,
this is surely little more than the current requirement to give reasons
for sentence37; arguably, the duty to explain why an oﬀence cannot be
dealt with by way of a community sentence already falls within the
current duty imposed upon the court. Second, even if the proposal is
discretely diﬀerent from the current duty to give reasons for the
sentence imposed on an oﬀender, this duty is in practice ineﬀective at
compelling sentencing courts to modify their practice, as a failure to
give adequate reasons does not invalidate a custodial sentence.38
The Sentencing Council39 addressed the problem in 2016 when it
consulted on a draft guideline concerning the imposition of com-
munity and custodial sentences.40 However, the approach taken by
the draft guideline failed to assuage concerns about the custody
threshold. A joint academic response to the consultation paper crit-
icised the ‘‘[broad reproduction of] the relevant statutory provisions’’
noting that ‘‘it [contained] no guidance on how to apply them’’.41 The
response acknowledged that the Court of Appeal had declined to
expand upon the concept but maintained that it was ‘‘vital’’ that the
Council provide ‘‘substantive guidance’’, oﬀering some alternative
methodologies for providing guidance on what was accepted to be a
diﬃcult issue. These suggestions notwithstanding, the deﬁnitive
guideline (issued in late 2016) simply restates the statutory test and
asserts that there is no general deﬁnition of where the custody
37 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.174(2) states: ‘‘The court must state in open court,
in ordinary language and in general terms, the court’s reasons for deciding on the
sentence.’’
38 For example, see Attorney General’s Reference (No.91 of 2007) (R. v Butlin)
[2007] EWCA Crim 2626; [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 8.
39 The Sentencing Council of England and Wales is the statutory authority which
issues deﬁnitive sentencing guidelines. See A. Ashworth and J.V. Roberts (eds.),
Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013).
40 Sentencing Council of England and Wales, Imposition of Community and
Custodial Sentences: Draft Guideline (2016), available at: https://www.sentencing
council.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Draft-Guideline-Imposition-of-CCS-FINAL.
pdf.
41 L. Harris et al, ‘‘Response to Sentencing Council’s consultation paper on the
imposition of custody and community sentences’’ (2016) 1 Sentencing News 12.
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threshold lies.42 The deﬁnitive guideline additionally repeats the
statement from the 1990 White Paper that the intention of the pro-
vision is to reserve custody for the most serious cases, but it oﬀers no
further guidance on how to identify these cases.
In circumstances where the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division),
the Sentencing Council and academics have been unable to improve
on the wording of the custody threshold provision, the conclusion
appears to be that – at least in its current form – the wording cannot
be improved upon and the concept remains vague and problematic.
The position has therefore not advanced since the early 1990s.
1.2 The Relationship between the Custody Threshold and Surrounding
Provisions on Prior Convictions and on Pleas
We think that there is an important additional reason why the cus-
tody threshold provision has so far failed to achieve the objective of
restricting the use of custody to cases where the seriousness of the
oﬀence necessitates a custodial sentence. Although the provision
purports to focus upon oﬀence seriousness, the test in fact expands to
encompass case seriousness, opening the door to consideration of the
oﬀender’s previous convictions and other matters unrelated to the
oﬀence of conviction such as bail status at the time of the oﬀence.
The provision (s.152) does not stand alone and a related provision
engages the oﬀender’s prior convictions in the context of determining
seriousness. Sentencers are given further guidance as to how to apply
the test for imposing a custodial sentence in the form of other pro-
visions in the 2003 Act.43 Section 143, entitled ‘‘determining the
seriousness of the oﬀence’’, engages the oﬀender’s prior convictions,
as follows:
‘‘(1) In considering the seriousness of any oﬀence, the court must consider the
oﬀender’s culpability in committing the oﬀence and any harm which the of-
fence caused, was intended to cause or might foreseeably have caused.
42 Sentencing Council, Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences: Deﬁni-
tive Guideline (London: Sentencing Council, 2016), available at https://www.senten
cingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deﬁnitive-Guideline-Imposition-of-CCS-ﬁ
nal-web.pdf.
43 Sections 145 and 146 concern aggravation of an oﬀence by reference to race,
religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity, and mandate that such
features are treated as an aggravating factor when a court is determining the seri-
ousness of an oﬀence. Section 145 excludes racial or religious aggravation for of-
fences under Crime and Disorder Act 1998 ss. 29–32 where racial or religious
aggravation is an ingredient of the oﬀence.
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(2) In considering the seriousness of an oﬀence (the current oﬀence’) com-
mitted by an oﬀender who has one or more previous convictions, the court
must treat each previous conviction as an aggravating factor if (in the case of
that conviction) the court considers that it can reasonably be so treated having
regard, in particular, to
(a) the nature of the oﬀence to which the conviction relates and its relevance to
the current oﬀence, and
(b) the time that has elapsed since the conviction.’’
It can be seen that for the purposes of s.152, the ‘‘seriousness of the
oﬀence’’ is broadly deﬁned; it includes not only the oﬀence, assessed
by the culpability and harm approach now familiar in the English and
Welsh sentencing guidelines, but also factors beyond the oﬀence,
speciﬁcally limited to any relevant previous convictions, and whether
or not the oﬀence was committed on bail. It excludes other non-
oﬀence factors such as personal mitigation, equity mitigation and any
plea of guilty. Section 144 of the 2003 Act also requires a court to
consider the stage at which a guilty plea was indicated, and in what
circumstances it was entered, before deciding the nature of the sen-
tence to impose.44 The combination of s.152(2) and s.144 is contra-
dictory: in determining whether or not a custodial sentence should be
imposed, the court is to consider the seriousness of the oﬀence (which
does not include a guilty plea as a relevant consideration) yet a guilty
plea must be considered prior to determining what kind of sentence
to impose.
The upshot is a test which is theoretically inconsistent. By iden-
tifying oﬀence seriousness as the guiding consideration in determin-
ing whether the custody threshold has been crossed, s.152 reﬂects a
desert-based approach to sentencing. That being the case, an oﬀen-
der’s prior convictions should play only a limited role in the deter-
mination of the severity of sentence. Although there are competing
accounts of the role of previous convictions in desert-based sen-
tencing, the consensual position among proponents of proportion-
ality is that prior misconduct should not exercise a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on sentence severity. The seriousness of the oﬀence is
unaﬀected by whether the oﬀender has a short or long criminal his-
44 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.144(1) states: ‘‘In determining what sentence to pass
on an oﬀender who has pleaded guilty to an oﬀence in proceedings before that or
another court, a court must take into account:(a) the stage in the proceedings for the
oﬀence at which the oﬀender indicated his intention to plead guilty, and(b) the
circumstances in which this indication was given.’’ A natural interpretation of the
language therefore suggests that a guilty plea is relevant to the nature of the sentence
to be imposed, not simply its length.
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tory.45 Whether repeat oﬀenders are more culpable is a disputed
question; many retributivists deny any link between culpability and
previous oﬀending.46 Even those who see some retributive signiﬁ-
cance in an oﬀender’s record regard it as a modest source of aggra-
vation.47
The methodology which emerges from the ensemble of statutory
provisions and the case law is thus unnecessarily complex. First, s.152
requires a court to determine whether the custodial threshold has
been passed. This determination is guided by the seriousness of the
oﬀence, a retributive consideration. However, in determining seri-
ousness the court must move beyond the oﬀence to examine the of-
fender’s record, but not factors amounting to personal mitigation
which could be relevant to culpability. Section 143 states that a recent
and relevant criminal history should increase the seriousness of the
oﬀence (unless it would be unreasonable to do so). The consequence
is that there will be cases where the gravity of the oﬀence alone is
insuﬃcient to move the case across the custodial threshold, but the
oﬀender nevertheless ends there by virtue of his prior convictions, a
factor generally considered irrelevant to the retributive approach. If
this happens, the oﬀender now sits on the wrong side of the threshold,
but may be brought back over to the non-custodial side by virtue of
personal mitigation: factors such as good character, or primary
caregiver which again, are unrelated to retributive sentencing.48
This approach is reﬂected in the sentencing guidelines issued by
the Sentencing Council. The concept of the custody threshold is
incorporated into the various categories in the Council’s oﬀence-
based guidelines. The assessment of seriousness (for both the custo-
dial threshold and determining the length of the oﬀence) is informed
by the consideration of culpability and harm as the ﬁrst step in the
45 Some retributivist scholars argue that prior convictions reﬂect enhanced cul-
pability. For opposing retributive perspectives on the role of previous convictions at
sentencing, see J.V. Roberts and A. von Hirsch (eds.) Previous Convictions at Sen-
tencing (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).
46 See discussion in J.V. Roberts, Punishing Persistent Oﬀenders (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
47 See discussion in J.V. Roberts and A. von Hirsch, fn. 45 above.
48 As noted by the Lord Chief Justice Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: ‘‘The
seriousness of the oﬀence determines whether it crosses what is known as the the
custody threshold’, but factors personal to the oﬀender can justify the court in
passing a non-custodial sentence even where the custodial threshold is crossed’’.
Lord Chief Justice Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, How Important is Punishment?
Speech to the Howard League, 15 November 2007, at 12.
JULIAN V. ROBERTS AND LYNDON HARRIS
process. Whereas this demonstrates to sentencers the location of the
custody threshold by reference to the oﬀence categories,49 in reality it
merely transfers the exercise of discretion from identifying the cus-
tody threshold to determining which category to place the oﬀence
and thus the result remains the same. Accordingly, even with the
advent of guidelines in England and Wales, the custody threshold
remains a vague and poorly deﬁned concept as the guidelines have
not engaged with the threshold as a concept to any signiﬁcant extent.
This problem is compounded by the Council’s decision not to attempt
to deﬁne the custody threshold in the Imposition of Community and
Custodial Sentences Deﬁnitive Guideline.50
Taken together, these critiques help explain why the custody
threshold has not restrained the use of custody as a sanction as was
intended by Parliament; the case for reform remains, we suggest,
compelling.
If the custody threshold is working well, the prison population
should be composed of oﬀenders convicted of serious crimes for
which no community based order was appropriate. There is com-
pelling evidence in England and Wales that this is not the case. This
may be illustrated by reference to recent sentencing statistics. Theft
accounts for a high volume of cases. Almost 100,000 oﬀenders were
sentenced for a theft oﬀence: approximately 10% of all sentenced
cases. In 2014, approximately one-third of oﬀenders convicted of
theft received a sentence of immediate custody or a suspended sen-
tence order.51 Since theft is (generally) a low seriousness crime, it is
49 For example, in the Council’s Assault Oﬀences Deﬁnitive Guideline (available at
http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Assault_deﬁnitive_guide
line_-_Crown_Court.pdf), Category 2 speciﬁes for oﬀences causing ‘‘actual bodily
harm (ABH) a range of a low-level community order to 26 weeks’ custody. There
fore, with oﬀences falling within Category 2 being those which typically involve
greater harm and lesser culpability or lesser harm and higher culpability (but not
both) sentencers are more easily able to ascertain the location of the custody
threshold by a consideration of where a Category 2 oﬀences falls within the category
range.
50 Above fn 42. Interestingly, this is in contrast to the approach to the imposition
of suspended sentence orders. The guideline provides general guidance as to the type
of case which may be suitable for a suspended sentence order, see p. 8 of the
guideline.
51 Before a court may impose a suspended sentence order (SSO) it must impose a
term of imprisonment. An SSO is therefore a term of imprisonment, albeit one which
is suspended. Statistics on the use of these sentences for theft can be found in
Sentencing Council, Consultation on Draft Guideline for Imposition of Community &
Custodial Sentences (London: Sentencing Council, 2015).
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plausible to conclude that many of these oﬀenders were committed to
custody as a result of their prior oﬀending histories.
The sentencing pattern for theft suggests one way in which the
custody threshold has misﬁred: although designed to ensure that
crime seriousness determines whether the oﬀender receives a term of
custody rather than a community penalty, many oﬀenders convicted
of low seriousness crimes nevertheless are sentenced to prison. In our
view, a custody threshold should exercise greater control over the
decision to imprison. It should ensure that crime seriousness does
indeed determine whether custody is imposed. In this way the
underlying commitment to proportionate punishment is respected.
Since serious oﬀences represent a small proportion of the total
caseload appearing for sentencing, an eﬀective custody threshold
would incarnate the spirit of restraint identiﬁed at the beginning of
this article. An ancillary beneﬁt of an eﬀective custody threshold
would be to exercise some restraint over admissions to custody, thus
preventing the prisons from ﬁlling up with less serious cases.
In Part II of this article, we address how the custody provision in
England and Wales could be made more eﬀective, developing a
proposal to reformulate the existing provision.
II REFORMULATING THE CUSTODY THRESHOLD IN
ENGLAND AND WALES
2.1 Clarifying s.152 and its Relationship to s.143
If the sentencing regime reﬂects a proportionality model, the deter-
mination of whether the custodial threshold has been passed should
focus on the oﬀence and the oﬀender’s culpability for that oﬀence.
Any wider inquiry – into personal mitigation, the impact of the
sentence on third parties and so on – would result in a loss of clarity
in terms of penal censure. The sentence should reﬂect state censure
for a speciﬁc act. This is not to deny a role for such other factors in
ultimately determining whether the oﬀender should be imprisoned.
These (and related) circumstances should result in many cases in
which the custodial threshold is passed yet where a non-custodial
alternative is imposed. But incorporating considerations unrelated to
the oﬀence in the initial determination obscures the sentencing mes-
sage of penal censure, which is for a speciﬁc proscribed act.
Our reconceptualisation recognises that there are two principal ways
in which the custodial threshold fails to restrict admissions to custody to
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the most serious cases. Some cases are committed to custody when the
court has over-estimated the gravity of the oﬀence, and imposed custody
when a community order would have been suﬃcient. It is hard to
determine how many admissions to custody are explained on this basis,
or even how an independent authority might establish whether this was
the case. After all, in a pluralistic society, some people will see signiﬁcant
harm in conduct others regard as relatively trivial infractions of the
criminal law. One way of establishing the degree to which this occurs
would involve an external audit of a sample of decisions to imprison.
This might be conducted by an independent judicial authority and cor-
respond to reviews of decisions to prosecute.52
The second and more common cause of incarceration for conduct
insuﬃciently serious to justify custody involves oﬀenders convicted of
minor crimes and who have lengthy records of recent, related prior
convictions. At present, a signiﬁcant (but unknown) number of
oﬀenders are committed to custody, notwithstanding the custodial
threshold provision, by virtue of their criminal records. In such cases, a
court may feel compelled to reﬂect the record by incarcerating the
oﬀender. This may occur through the application of section 143 which
encourages such an approach, or because the court, having repeatedly
imposed non-custodial sentences, sees no reasonable alternative except
escalating the severity of the court’s response by changing the nature of
the sanction.53 Our proposed reform would address the latter of these
two sources of prison admission, by modifying the relationship be-
tween prior convictions and the custodial threshold.
Currently, and as noted, oﬀenders may be propelled across the
custodial threshold as a result of their prior convictions alone. This
phenomenon is described as ‘‘push-in’’ in the US guidelines; it occurs
when an oﬀender convicted of an oﬀence that would normally attract
a non-custodial sentence is ‘‘pushed-in’’ to the custodial zone of the
sentencing grid solely by virtue of his previous convictions.54 We take
52 For further discussion of this proposal, see J.V. Roberts and L. Harris, ‘‘Ad-
dressing the Problems of the Prison Estate: The Role of Sentencing Policy’’, Prison
Service Journal, in press.
53 On this latter point, a number of jurisdictions have codiﬁed directions to courts
to encourage them to consider alternatives to custody, even when the imposition of
community-based sentences in the past has failed to prevent re-oﬀending.
54 For example, a ﬁrst oﬀender oﬀender convicted of a seriousness level VII of-
fence receives a stayed sentence. If he has 3 criminal history points the presumptive
sentence becomes 54 months’ imprisonment. For discussion, see R. Frase et al.,
Sourcebook of Criminal History Enhancements (Minneapolis: Robina Institute,
Faculty of Law, University of Minnesota 2015).
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the view that while an oﬀender’s past should be taken into account at
sentencing, prior convictions alone should not make the diﬀerence
between community and custody, except in exceptional circum-
stances. The aggravating eﬀect of prior convictions should be limited
to increasing the severity of the non-custodial sentence or increasing
the length of the term of imprisonment but should not change the
nature of the sanction.
Why should the power of previous convictions to aggravate sen-
tence severity be normally restricted to increasing the quantum55 of
punishment within a particular sanction range? The reason returns us
to the notion of ‘‘just deserts’’. If a mitigating or aggravating factor is
of marginal (or worse, no) relevance to the oﬀence, giving it undue
weight undermines the concept of proportionality. In this sense,
restricting the power of previous convictions is simply part of a
broader requirement to preserve proportionality.
How then, should previous convictions aﬀect sentence severity?
Where the oﬀence has crossed the custody threshold, the matter is
easily dealt with by a modest increase in the duration of imprison-
ment. However, where the oﬀence has not crossed the custody
threshold, but is near to it – i.e., a high level community order – the
solution is not so simple. There are multiple options, but our pre-
ferred method would involve an extension of existing community
order requirements. By enabling the court to impose (a) a certain
number of hours, or additional hours of unpaid work; or (b) an
extended operational period of an electronically monitored curfew, to
reﬂect the oﬀender’s previous convictions, the sentence for the oﬀence
and the increase for the prior record are separately marked,
enhancing transparency and public understanding. Additionally, for
an appellate court, the sentence is clearer and easier to understand.56
Preventing a court from imprisoning an oﬀender on the basis of
his record alone represents as signiﬁcant departure from current
practice in all common law jurisdictions. In England and Wales the
statutory provision regulating the consideration of previous convic-
tions allows this basis for committal to custody. In addition, a sig-
55 It is of course not just about sanction-change; a quasi-retributive factor should
not reduce a sentence from 15 to ﬁve years for the same reason. Yet the shift from
community to custody is so fundamental and is more radical than, say, the trans-
formation from a ﬁne to a community order.
56 In some sentencing appeals, the Court of Appeal has to make assumptions as to
the sentencing judge’s methodology and approach when they only have the ﬁnal
sentence imposed to inform their discussions. This is further complicated by
reductions for totality and guilty pleas.
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niﬁcant number of oﬀenders in states such as Minnesota are sent to
prison as a result of their criminal history score alone. It would be
unrealistic to expect courts to abandon this practice. For this reason,
we advocate an exceptional circumstance provision which would
permit a court to imprison certain highly repetitive oﬀenders. This
might adopt wording which would explicitly proscribe a policy of
incarcerating on record:
An oﬀender’s prior convictions are normally relevant only to the quantum of
punishment imposed, and may not alone justify committal to custody. Only
when the oﬀender has a very extensive record of prior convictions and the
court has exhausted all non-custodial sentencing options may a term of cus-
tody be imposed to reﬂect this.
A provision of this kind would at least inhibit the use of imprison-
ment in cases where the oﬀence(s) of conviction alone do not justify
committal to custody. As with all sentences of imprisonment the
court should give reasons, and impose the shortest period of
imprisonment.
2.2 The Relationship Between a Guilty Plea and the Decision
to Imprison
For similar reasons as those pertaining to previous convictions, we
propose a more limited role for the consideration of a guilty plea.57
We advocate the view that a guilty plea is, in the context of factors
relevant to sentencing, sui generis; it is a transaction between the state
and the defendant borne out of pragmatism, as opposed to the more
traditional view that in pleading guilty a defendant demonstrates
remorse for his or her actions and an insight into the eﬀect of the
oﬀence on the victim(s). In pleading guilty, a defendant ‘‘buys’’ a
shorter sentence in exchange for the ﬁnancial and social beneﬁts of
not having a trial. This view is supported by the Sentencing Council;
in their guidelines, remorse is listed as a mitigating factor at Step
Two, distinct from the consideration of any guilty plea. Further, in its
recent consultation paper on the use of custodial sentences, the
Council oﬀered the following rationale:
57 Plea is important not just because of the statutory direction for courts to take
this factor into account but because, like previous convictions, it aﬀects a very high
percentage of cases appearing for sentencing. Approximately 90% of cases sentenced
in the courts involve a guilty plea rather than a conviction following trial; see J.V.
Roberts and B. Bradford, Sentence Reductions for a Guilty Plea: New Empirical
Evidence from England and Wales’ (2015) 12 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 187.
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The purpose of reducing the sentence for a guilty plea is to yield the beneﬁts
described above and the guilty plea should be considered by the court to be
independent of the oﬀender’s personal mitigation. Thus factors such as
admissions at interview, co-operation with the investigation and demonstra-
tions of remorse should not be taken into account in determining the level of
reduction. Rather, they should be considered separately and prior to any guilty
plea reduction, as potential mitigating factors.58
As noted above, giving a factor that is of no clear relevance to harm
or culpability such prominence in the determination of sentence type
would be to undermine proportionality. Where the oﬀence is so
serious that only a custodial sentence can be justiﬁed, there is no
justiﬁable reason why a guilty plea – a factor divorced from the
oﬀence entirely – should play a prominent (even determinative) role
in the decision as to the nature of sentence. However, that is not to
underplay the importance of a guilty plea. Our view is merely that
because it does not relate to the seriousness of the oﬀence (judged by
the harm caused by that oﬀence or the oﬀender’s culpability for that
oﬀence) its role in determining sentence should be circumscribed. As
such, we propose that once the custody threshold has been crossed,
absent exceptional circumstances, a guilty plea cannot bring an of-
fender back beneath the threshold. It would however, be possible for
a guilty plea to result in a suspended sentence order in place of an
immediate custodial term, as this is a form of custody.59
2.3 Proposed Methodology
We propose a staged approach to determining whether to imprison
the oﬀender, one which maps easily on to the sentencing guidelines
step-by-step methodology.60 The methodology consists of four
stages: the ﬁrst two stages determine the nature of the disposal,
principally custody or community, whereas the second two stages
determine only the extent to which the severity of sentence is in-
creased or decreased. The methodology is as follows.
58 Sentencing Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea Guideline Consul-
tation (London: Oﬃce of the Sentencing Council, 2016) at 13.
59 See Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.189(6).
60 The Council’s guidelines all follow the same approach, namely creating a series
of steps for all courts to follow when sentencing an oﬀender.
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First, a court should consider all factors relevant to the seriousness
of the oﬀence and the oﬀender’s culpability.61 If all sanctions other
than custody would fail to adequately reﬂect the total harm and
culpability, the custodial threshold has been passed. This calculation
excludes consideration of the oﬀender’s prior record for the purposes
of determining whether imprisonment is necessary,62 for the reasons
discussed earlier in this article.63 Relevant prior convictions should
not weigh against the oﬀender whose disposal hangs in the balance,
eﬀectively consigning him into prison on the basis of his record. We
would also exclude consideration of a plea of guilty from this cal-
culation for the reasons discussed above.
At the second stage, in the absence of any relevant prior convic-
tions the oﬀender is entitled to ﬁrst oﬀender mitigation, and this
should exercise a powerful inﬂuence over the decision to imprison.64
This stage also includes an assessment of all other aggravating and
mitigating factors concerned with the oﬀence and the oﬀender. These
factors may also have an important inﬂuence upon the nature of the
disposal.
Once a court has resolved whether the oﬀender has ended up in the
custodial or non-custodial zone, it should extend the term of custody
or enhance the punitiveness of the non-custodial sanction to the de-
gree that the oﬀender has recent, relevant convictions.65 In this way,
prior convictions aggravate the sentence imposed66 but would not
alter the nature of the sanction, consistent with the approach we
advocate here. A court should also consider plea at this point,
working in mitigation. A guilty plea is a non-retributive factor, and
should not make the diﬀerence between community and custody. A
guilty plea should reduce the sentence length (or the duration and
61 This corresponds to Step One of the methodology used in most of the Council’s
guidelines.
62 Again, under the Council’s methodology, prior convictions are excluded from
consideration at Step One.
63 With the limited exception of cases in which the oﬀender has a very signiﬁcant
history of prior oﬀending, see text.
64 For a summary of the justiﬁcations for ﬁrst oﬀender mitigation, see J.V. Ro-
berts, ‘‘Re-Examining First Oﬀender Discounts at Sentencing’’ in J.V. Roberts and
A. von Hirsch (eds.), fn. 45 above, ch. 2.
65 This too is consistent with the structure adopted by the guidelines.
66 The discussion in this chapter has focused exclusively on retributivism. An
alternative justiﬁcation for some, modest record-based sentencing premium is that an
enhanced penalty may deter or incapacitate the oﬀender, and hence prevent some
further oﬀending (see Frase et al., fn. 54 above).
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onerousness of a community order) according to the timing of the
plea as recommended by the deﬁnitive sentencing guideline. Since a
suspended sentence order is a form of custody, it seems appropriate
that a guilty plea should have the potential to move an oﬀender from
a term of immediate custody to one of suspended imprisonment.
Similarly, a signiﬁcant criminal record could operate in the opposite
direction, disentitling the oﬀender to a suspended sentence order,
where the court had already determined that the custodial threshold
has been passed. But as noted, neither consideration should have the
power to change the sentence from non-custodial to custodial, or vice
versa.
III CONCLUSION
The custodial threshold provision has to date failed to achieve its
stated objective of ensuring that only the most serious cases are
committed to custody. Rather than abandon the concept of a cus-
todial threshold we have suggested reformulating the provisions in a
way that focuses more clearly on the seriousness of the current of-
fence. By restricting the role of non-retributive factors such as prior
convictions and focusing a court’s attention more tightly on the
seriousness of the oﬀence, this formulation would have two principal
eﬀects. First, it would lower the volume of oﬀenders committed to
immediate custody by reducing the number of oﬀenders who are
‘‘pushed into prison’’ by virtue of their prior convictions. Second, the
cases committed to custody would conform more closely to the
proﬁle envisaged by a retributive sentencing philosophy.
Reducing the use of custody as a sanction will be neither easy nor
expeditious. It will require some political leadership, or at least
acceptance that the current levels of imprisonment are unacceptably
high, as well as a range of speciﬁc strategies to reduce the number of
oﬀenders sent to prison in a principled way. A useful, and symboli-
cally important ﬁrst step entails amending the key provisions which
attempt, albeit ineﬀectively, to regulate the use of custody.
The reform proposed here would enhance the proportionality of
current sentencing decisions in England and Wales by restricting the
role of factors unrelated to harm or culpability. At the same time it
may well reduce the volume of admissions to custody by lowering the
number of cases in which an oﬀender is imprisoned principally to
reﬂect his prior convictions.
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